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At the turn of the twentieth century, the owners ofnewspapers quickly understood the significance oftruly portable cameras when they began to be man-
ufactured. Photographers began to take photographs in
courts, mainly for the purposes of publishing images of
salacious trials and society gossip from the divorce courts.
This article sets out why the taking of photographs was
prohibited in courts in England & Wales in 1925 and out-
lines the recent decision by the Minister of Justice to per-
mit the use of cameras in court.
The use of cameras in court is not new. An exceedingly
brief summary (comprising three short paragraphs) of the
history leading up to the prohibition of the taking of
photographs was included in Broadcasting Courts Consultation
Paper initiated by the Lord Chancellor in 2004
(Department for Constitutional Affairs, CP 28/04,
November 2004). The late Professor Martin Dockray
(Martin Dockray, “Courts on Television”, 51 MLR 1988,
593–604) and Professor Rubin (Gerry Rubin, “Seddon,
Dell and Rock n’ Roll: Investigating Alleged Breaches of
the Ban on Publishing Photographs Taken Within Courts
or Their Precincts, 1925–1967”, Crim LR 874) have both
provided a more detailed explanation as to why Parliament
prohibited the taking of photographs in courts, and the
purpose of this part of the article is to fill in the small gap
left in their work.
The disquiet expressed over the taking of photographs
and the drawing of sketches in courts exercised
commentators in The Law Journal in the first two decades of
the twentieth century. This early discussion by lawyers in
the UK does not diminish the unease expressed at the
time, just because they were raised over one hundred years
ago. A recent text by Paul Lambert serves to illustrate the
range of problems that must be faced when television
cameras are permitted to enter the court to broadcast live
images of the proceedings (Paul Lambert, Courting Publicity:
Twitter and Television Cameras in Court, London, Bloomsbury
Professional, 2011). The issues that arose with the taking
of photographs in court that were expressed between 1910
and 1920 remain as relevant today as they were when they
were first aired. For this reason, it is of interest and
relevant to contemporary debates to understand the
concerns that were discussed in the lead up to the passing
of clause 41 of the Criminal Justice Bill in the UK,
especially because participants in the discussions
sometimes argued their point of view along themes of
human rights, even though they did not articulate their
thoughts with the concepts that were brought to bear mid-
way through the century. The historical view covered below
is taken from a law journal active at the turn of the
twentieth century, The Law Journal, and the reports from
the House of Commons in Hansard.
BALANCING THE NEED FOR OPEN JUSTICE
AGAINST THE QUEST FOR PRIVACY
The first report in The Law Journal considered the
decision by Sir Gorell Barnes (later Lord Gorell), when
taking his seat as President of the Divorce Court on August
9, 1906, to prohibit the practice of sketching in court. The
learned judge gave his reasons, based on his experience,
and no doubt he also took into account the grave
consideration for what was then considered to be a highly
embarrassing and socially destructive method of dealing
with incompatibility between husband and wife:
“After a long experience and close observation I feel convinced
that many persons who have to give evidence in cases in this
Court are embarrassed and rendered more self-conscious and
nervous than they otherwise would be to an extent which
affects the proper giving of their evidence, and that this acts to
their prejudice, and may interfere with the due administration
of justice. Pictorial illustrations which may draw attention to
divorce cases are not necessary, nor can they be said to be
really desirable in the public interest; but the action I propose
is to take is on the ground I have already stated. I do not
suppose that it has been realised how the taking of these
sketches may affect the witnesses in the course of the cases. I
expect that I have only to intimate how the practice may affect
trials here, and those who hitherto followed it will realise the
effect which both I and Mr Justice Bargrave Deane think it
has, and will cease from the practice.” (The Law Journal, vol
41, August 18, 1906, 564(a)).
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The comments by Sir Gorell Barnes indicate that the
practice of sketching in divorce courts must have been
causing profound concern, not only with the judges, but
also with those caught up in divorce proceedings. This was
illustrated in some of the comments made in the House of
Lords during the second reading of a Private Member’s
Bill, the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Bill
in 1925. Baron Darling of Langham spoke at some length
on this issue in relation to the divorce courts, and the Earl
of Desart made some important observations in relation to
the taking of photographs, illustrating the social stigma
associated with divorce proceedings at the time:
“What are these divorce cases? They are the tragedies of lives
that began happily and hopefully. It is cruel that these people
should have everything about their past shouted in the streets,
put on the placards and read by everybody, and that they
should themselves be photographed at the trial. It is cruelty
beyond words, especially on matters in which the public have
no right to have an interest. It advantages justice in no way
that I can see whatever. Indeed, it has rather the contrary
effect. I have known cases in my own experience in which
important witnesses, who ought to be called, have asked when
they were asked for their statement: ‘Am I to give this evidence
in court? Will my name be in the papers?’ and when they
were told that they must give evidence in court, they replied: ‘I
will not tell you anything.’ I do not blame them; I think they
are perfectly right. In that sense it is a detriment to justice.’
(HL Deb, vol 62, col 141, July 16, 1925)
In response, the Lord Chancellor raised the dilemma
that must always be dealt with, and where to draw the line:
“Your Lordships will not forget this, that for some purposes
publicity is necessary for justice. When a man or woman has
been publicly accused and the matter comes into court then, if
the judgment of the law is in his favour, it is right that, that
fact should be brought to the public knowledge. On the other
hand, there are cases where, if a verdict is against him, it is
equally just that he should suffer the penalty of publicity.
Therefore one must take care not to endeavour to suppress
publication of facts of that kind where the very publication is
essential to justice being done, and not to create suspicion in
the public mind that because there is secrecy there is some
defect in the administration.” (HL Deb, vol 62, cols
142–43, July 16, 1925)
THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AND
OTHERS AFFECTED BY THE TAKING OF
PHOTOGRAPHS
Disquiet over the rights of the accused were expressed
by “A London Editor,” the author of a book entitled Modern
Journalism, and discussed by a commentator in the April 30,
1910 issue of The Law Journal. (It has not been possible to
find the publisher of this book, and it does not appear to
be available in the British Library, although it seems that
the author had also written to The Times on this issue: The
Law Journal, vol 45, July 9, 1910, 450(b)). It appears that
by 1910 the “operations of the photographer have become
more frequent in our Courts of justice”, in both civil and
criminal proceedings. This problem has re-emerged with
the mobile telephone, as observed by Aikens J in R v Vincent
D [2004] EWCA Crim 1271. This case involved the taking
of a photograph on a mobile telephone during a criminal
trial, in which the learned judge commented at [15] that:
“It is well known that taking photographs using mobile
phones in court has become a major problem and concern in
both Magistrates’ Courts and the Crown Court of England
and Wales. It is also of concern in the civil courts.”
The commentator in 1910 argued that consideration
ought to be given to making the taking of photographs
punishable by contempt of court, and a paragraph was
quoted from Modern Journalism to substantiate the
argument, part of which reads:
“In the case of the prisoner who is found not guilty it is a
sufficient ordeal that his name should appear throughout the
press as a potential criminal; but that his very portrait, taken
at a time when his position is felt most acutely, should appear
side by side with the police narrative, is an action calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering to a man who has already
suffered too much.” (The Law Journal, vol 45, April 30,
1910, 238(b))
The commentator subsequently reiterated the point that
the taking of photographs had a deleterious effect on the
accused, especially if they were acquitted (The Law Journal,
vol 45, July 9, 1910, 450(b)). These observations are
almost identical to the comments made by the European
Court of Human Rights in Egeland and Hanseid v Norway
ECHR (34438/04), April 16, 2009, regarding the right to
respect for private and family life pursuant to article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights.
The first reference in The Law Journal that discusses
photography in court is that of a photograph taken in the
dock of Bow Street Police Court in 1910 of Dr Hawley
Harvey Crippen and Ethel le Neve. Sir Albert de Rutzen
prohibited the taking of photographs in the Police Court,
although it only appeared that he prohibited the taking of
photographs of witnesses. The commentator in The Law
Journal agreed that it was “a scandal that a witness in a
sensational case, whether he desires the publicity or not,
should have his portrait reproduced in a public print to
gratify the vulgar curiosity of the multitude”, and continued
with the theme that the accused should not have their images
published in the newspapers. This was because they may be
found to be innocent of the crime they are charged with,
bearing in mind that it was a “common thing for prisoners
to be photographed in the dock” and such activities had the
effect of causing “an innocent man and his relatives
additional suffering than the knowledge that his portrait is
being circulated in this way throughout the land.” The
practice was also of concern for the due administration of
the law, given that it irritated and unnerved witnesses (The
Law Journal, vol, 45, September 17, 1910, 588(b)–589(a))
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The commentator later referred to the “vulgar
entertainment of the ‘snapshot’ journalist,” who caused the
members of the Jockey Club to prohibit the use of the
camera in the enclosures of the race meetings under its
control, and continued to suggest that the judges in the High
Court might consider the issue in relation to the dignity of
the courts (The Law Journal, vol 45, October 15, 1910,
652(a)). The dignity of the courts and the taking of
photographs was again raised in comments made about the
acquittal of Harold Jones for the murder of eight-year old
Freda Burnell on June 21, 1921, and his subsequent
conviction for a second murder of 11-year old Florrie Little
on July 8, 1921 (The Law Journal, vol 56, November 5, 1921,
393(a)–(b)). Apparently the press reported the first trial
extensively, including photographs of Jones in the dock (Paul
Harrison, South Wales Murder Casebook, (Countryside Books,
1995); Neil Milkins, Every Mother’s Nightmare – Abertillery in
Mourning, (Rose Heyworth Press, 2008)). However, when
the Crippen case reached the Central Criminal Court, the
Lord Chief Justice did not formally prohibit the taking of
photographs in court, although only sketches of the accused
and a number of witnesses subsequently appeared in the
halfpenny journals. The inconsistency in dealing with
photography and sketching was exhibited during the same
week when the Lord Chief Justice failed to prohibit the
practice, because Mr Justice Scrutton issued a warning in his
court in the Central Criminal Court upon being informed
that a person was sketching. Unless the judiciary adopted a
consistent approach to the practice, and used their powers
to deal with the practice of “snapshotting”, members of the
press were bound to face inconsistency when reporting on
legal proceedings (The Law Journal, vol 45, October 22,
1910, 661(b); The Law Journal, vol 46, March 18, 1911,
162(a)–(b)).
This state of affairs continued until at least 1920, when
Mr Justice Horridge was presiding in what was known as
the “Green Bicycle case” (H R Wakefield, The Green Bicycle
Case, (Philip Allan, 1930); C.Wendy East, The Green Bicycle
Murder, (Sutton Publications, 1993)). Mr Justice Horridge
interrupted counsel’s reply for the defence because he
observed a man in the public gallery holding up a camera.
The man was brought before the judge, and explained he
was not aware that there was a law against the taking of
photographs in court. The correspondent in The Law
Journal indicated that Mr Justice Horridge “threatened that
if the man denied knowledge of such a law, he would be
treated more severely”, and he was removed from the
court. The commentator went on to write: “we are rather
inclined, ourselves, to doubt the existence of the alleged
‘law’ – and to regret its absence” (The Law Journal, vol 55,
June 19, 1920, 229(a))
Photography and the effect on the members of the
jury
The effect on those people whose photographs were
taken in court was not restricted to the witnesses or the
accused – it included the members of the jury. The
members of the jury in the 1911 case of R v Morrison,
known as the Clapham murder case, in which Stinie
Morrison was indicated and subsequently found guilty of
the murder of Leon Beron (Proceedings of the Central
Criminal Court, March 6-15, 1911, 477-535; Old Bailey
Online Reference Number: t19110228-43) made
representations to Mr Justice Darling directly on this
point. Mr Justice Darling commented on the
communication by the jury:
“This is an intimation from the jury in which they protest
against the continual snapshotting of members of the jury
which is going on, and they point out that not only it is a
nuisance to them, but it may be in some circumstances a
source of danger to those who are engaged in the
administration of justice. Judges, of course, must take their
chances, but people who are brought from their home to serve
on juries are not protected as judges are. I think this is a most
reasonable protest made on behalf of the jury. This practice
has become now far too common …” (The Law Journal, vol
46, March 18, 1911, 162(a) – this commentary was not
published in Proceedings of the Central Criminal Court).
Yet a further reason for prohibiting the taking of
photographs in court was canvassed by the commentator in
The Law Journal in the following week, March 25 1911. In his
summing up, Mr Justice Darling is reported to have
commented on an assurance given by the Home Secretary
that he would consider the issue of taking photographs of
the parties, witnesses and members of the jury in sensational
trials. However, Mr Justice Darling is also reported as having
commented on the photograph of an accused in court
immediately after their arrest, in that it might interfere with
the process of their identification – something that was
prejudicial to the accused and the prosecution.
RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEMS – THE
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
The first reference of an exchange in the House of
Commons in relation to photographs in court was between
Mr Nield and the Home Secretary, Winston Churchill in
1911, in which Mr Nield asked whether “he will at an early
date introduce legislation to prevent a continuance of the
practice both as to civil as well as criminal tribunals?” To
which Mr Churchill replied that the “question is receiving
my consideration” (HC Deb, vol 22, col 2237, March 15,
1911). A further exchange that illustrated the concern in
relation to this matter occurred between Mr MacCallum
Scott and Mr McKenna, the Secretary of State for the
Home Department, in relation to a photograph taken in
the Central Criminal Court of the judge passing sentence
of death on Frederick Seddon, who was convicted of
murder. Mr MacCallum Scott expressed a concern that
remains with us in the twenty-first century, implicitly
making the point that the only interest the members of the
press had (an underlying theme throughout the
commentaries in The Law Journal) was to take advantage of
the sensational nature of the event and to make money
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(HC Deb, vol 35, col 1529, March 18, 1912; The Law
Journal, vol 47, March 23, 1912, 202(b)).
A further exchange took place on March 21, 1912, in
which the Home Secretary informed the House that the
court had not given permission for the taking of the
photograph. He went on to suggest that “it must have been
taken without authority and surreptitiously”, and
expressed the view that the Lord Mayor, Sheriffs and
officers of the court shared the indignation that was
expressed (The Law Journal, volume 47, March 30, 1912,
222(a); HC Deb, vol 35, col 2067, March 21, 1912). This
photograph was of particular concern, because it showed
Bucknill J wearing the black cap, the clerks below the
judge, the prisoner receiving the death sentence, the
members of the jury, and all of the lawyers. The
photograph was taken from the public gallery, with the
judge to the right and the dock to the left, which meant the
person taking the photograph had a sweeping panoramic
view of most of the court and those in the court at the time
the photograph was taken – Martin Dockray thought the
photograph was a composite (Martin Dockray, “Courts on
Television”, 595, n 14). A copy of this photograph, and the
photograph of Crippen and Ethel le Neve, is available on-
line at http://www.blog.murdermap.co.uk/current-
affairs/a-brief-history-of-cameras-in-court/.
By 1922, the Lord Chancellor issued an order
prohibiting the taking of photographs in and any enclosure
of the Royal Courts of Justice, although this order did not
cover the criminal courts. Since the order of Sir Gorell
Barnes prohibiting the practice of sketching in court,
judges had begun to consider the taking of photographs to
be a nuisance, and apparently, photographers had
increasingly take up positions within the railed enclosure of
the main entrance to the Royal Courts of Justice for the
purpose of taking photographs (The Law Journal, vol 57,
May 27, 1922, 180(b)). By 1925, it became clear that
politicians had attempted to prohibit the taking of
photographs and sketching in courts. The Law Journal
reported that the Criminal Justice Bill was one of a number
“tossing on the troubled seas of Parliament for nearly three
years, and which failed to pass, both in 1923 and 1924,
only because of the General Elections” (The Law Journal, vol
60, March 14, 1925, 252–53; the Home Secretary, Sir
William Joynson Hicks, also commented upon this: HC
Deb, vol 183, col 1593, May 11, 1925).
THE 1925 CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL
During the debate in the House of Commons on the
clause dealing with the prohibition of taking photographs
in courts in November 1925, the Home Secretary, Sir
William Joynson Hicks, indicated that the clause was
introduced into the Bill in 1924 by the Labour
Government, and was not in the Bill of 1923. When he
became Home Secretary, he thought it was such a good
clause that he included it in the Bill (HC Deb, vol 188, col
839, November 20, 1925). What seems to be the first
reference to the particular clause dealing with the
prohibition in the Criminal Justice Bill is from the House
of Lords in 1924 (HL Deb, vol 56, cols 796–98, March 18,
1924). When discussed in the House, the relevant clause in
the Bill was clause 36 (it later became cl 40, and was finally
cl 41 in the Act, for which see below). The draft excluded
members of the jury, and the Lord Chancellor moved to
include the words “or a juror” in subsection (1) (a), after
“court”, on the basis that “the jurors say, with some force,
that the provision ought to be framed in such a fashion as
to include themselves. They do not like being
photographed, for the same reasons as other persons
concerned, and we propose to extend the benefits of the
clause to them.” This was agreed.
The exasperation caused by the practice of people taking
photographs was illustrated when the Home Secretary, Sir
William Joynson Hicks, moved the second reading of the Bill
in the House of Commons. He remarked: “There is a small
Clause to prevent photographs of the parties being taken in
Court. Everybody has suffered for a long time by prisoners
in the dock and witnesses being pilloried by having their
photographs taken, and this is to prevent that happening”
(HC Deb, vol 183, col 1599, May 11, 1925). By November
20, opposition to the clause was brought to the fore with a
number of amendments that were moved, although none
were passed. The debate that took place illustrated a number
of the concerns by those that opposed and supported the
clause. Colonel Wedgwood (by this time a member of the
Labour party) objected to the clause partly on the basis that
it created “fresh offences and fresh excuses to send people to
prison”. He took the view that legal proceedings are public,
and it therefore follows that: “It may be very undesirable
from the point of view of the person whose picture is taken,
but if persons go to law, and come before the public, it seems
to me that the public as a whole has just as much right to
have a photograph as to have their lives dealt with, or an
account of their career put into the public Press.”
Colonel Wedgwood concluded by commenting that this
was a “habit of grandmotherly legislation in the interests of
what is said to be morality [and] seems to me to be a very
unfortunate development of modern times” (HC Deb, vol
188, col 833 November 20, 1925). This view was supported
by Mr R H Morris, who posed the conundrum: “I fail to
understand what distinction can be drawn between the
publication of the photographs of these people in the
Courts, and the publication of the account of the trials” (HC
Deb, vol 188, col 834, November 20, 1925). The Member
for Cambridge University, Mr Rawlinson, emphasised the
distress caused to witnesses, a position supported by Mr F A
Broad, the Labour Member for Edmonton:
“… the matter is serious where you have to persuade people
to come into Court for the purpose of defending their rights,
and I can assure hon. Members that a large number of
people, both men and women, are terrified to come into the
Court because their photographs or a sketch of them are likely
to be put in the various papers. They go to Court and you
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subsequently see photographs of them with their hands in
front of faces showing their objection to it. I can tell the
House, in my own experience, that this really is a thing which
is interfering with the courts of justice at the present time”
(HC Deb, vol, 188 cols 834–35, November 20, 1925).
Captain William Wedgwood Benn (by this time a member
of the Labour party) countered this point with an argument
that recalls the super injunction debacle in early 2012:
“There have been unpleasant cases in which witnesses may have
been deterred from coming forward by the fear that their
photographs would appear in the newspapers, and that no doubt
is an argument for this Clause; but there must be some limit.
We had the ‘Mr. A’ case [Mr A was Sir Hari Singh, a 25-year-
old prince: Gerry Rubin, “Seddon, Dell and Rock n’ Roll:
Investigating Alleged Breaches of the Ban on Publishing
Photographs Taken Within Courts or Their Precincts,
1925–1967”, at 879], where an attempt was made to
conceal the identity of one of the parties in the case. It must be
recognised that there are certain penalties of publicity involved in
the ordinary public administration of justice. As a rule, the
name of the witness is given and there is a certain amount of
publicity, and we must weigh up the disadvantages that this may
bring in exceptional cases against the grave disadvantage of
creating a new Press law …” (HC Deb, vol 188, col 837,
November 20, 1925).
However, Sir William Joynson Hicks was not to be
moved by this line of reasoning, on the basis that the taking
of photographs of people in court had “become an added
terror to the administration of justice” (HC Deb, vol 188,
col 839, November 20, 1925). George Lansbury, who
might be considered to have been a somewhat radical
member of the Labour party, expressed his opinion in the
vigorous style he used, mostly in relation to the
relationship between the government and the press, and it
is reminiscent of the difficulties currently being faced by
politicians and members of the press through the Leveson
Inquiry (the Prime Minister established an inquiry under
the Inquiries Act 2005, HC, col 312, July 13, 2011):
“This is another sample of the cowardice of Governments—I
will not discriminate between Governments—in dealing with
the Press, when the Press take up an attitude on a particular
question. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the
Aston Division (Sir E Cecil) introduced a Bill dealing in an
effective manner with a growing evil of our time, namely, the
pernicious and outrageous manner in which rich men get
richer by retailing filth day by day and every Sunday. It is
perfectly monstrous the sort of stuff that is retailed out in
what is called the popular Press. You talk about Bolshevism
and any other ism, but it is nothing compared with the moral
degradation that is caused by this literature, and no
Government dare tackle it. You are tackling here just the
fringe of the question, but in my judgment the rich well-to-do
purveyors of filth do not mind this Clause.’ (HC Deb, vol
188, col 842, November 20, 1925).
The clause as passed provided as follows:
41 Prohibition on taking photographs, &c., in court.
(1) No person shall—
(a) take or attempt to take in any court any photograph, or
with a view to publication make or attempt to make in
any court any portrait or sketch, of any person, being a
judge of the court or a juror or a witness in or a party
to any proceedings before the court, whether civil or
criminal; or
(b) publish any photograph, portrait or sketch taken or
made in contravention of the foregoing provisions of
this section or any reproduction thereof;
and if any person acts in contravention of this section
he shall, on summary conviction, be liable in respect of
each offence to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) the expression “court” means any court of justice,
including the court of a coroner:
(b) the expression “Judge” includes recorder [the word
‘recorder’ was repealed by the Courts Act 1971 (c. 23),
Sch. 11 Pt. IV], registrar, magistrate, justice and coroner:
(c) a photograph, portrait or sketch shall be deemed to be
a photograph, portrait or sketch taken or made in court
if it is taken or made in the court–room or in the build-
ing or in the precincts of the building in which the
court is held, or if it is a photograph, portrait or sketch
taken or made of the person while he is entering or
leaving the court–room or any such building or
precincts as aforesaid.
As indicated by Professor Rubin, the reasoning for the
passing of section 41 was not articulated coherently. There
was an emphasis on the need to uphold “good taste”, but
arguably some of the human rights arguments were
concealed beneath the lack of clarity of reasoning, which is
understandable, given the changes that were to occur in the
world in the years after the passing of the Act (Gerry
Rubin, “Seddon, Dell and Rock n’ Roll: Investigating
Alleged Breaches of the Ban on Publishing Photographs
Taken Within Courts or Their Precincts, 1925–1967”, at
877–80). This is the law that pertains in 2012, with the
exception that it does not apply to the Supreme Court, as
provided for by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005,
section 47, and includes sound images – section 9 of the
Contempt of Court Act 1981 prohibits the recording of
sounds except with leave of the court, and section 9(2)
makes it a contempt of court to broadcast recordings of
court proceedings to the public.
In J Barber & Sons v Lloyd’s Underwriters [1987] 1 QB 103,
a case that dealt with the examination of a witness by
videotape, which was granted, section 41 was interpreted
to prohibit filming in court. In R v Loveridge, Lee and
Loveridge [2001] 2 Cr App R 29, CA, the police secretly26
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recorded the applicants during a hearing inside a
Magistrates’ Court. The video recording was adduced in
evidence during their trial, and on appeal, it was stated that
the filming was unlawful, but it was admissible, and article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights was not
affected because the action by the police did not affect
their right to a fair trial. (For the position in Scotland, see
the 1992 Practice Direction by Lord President and Lord
Justice General (Lord Hope) dated August 5, 1992, a
discussion of which can be found in X v British Broadcasting
Corporation and Lion Television Limited (trading as Lion Television
Scotland) [2005] CSOH 80, at [4]–[5]).
The phrase “in the precincts of the building in which the
court is held” exercised some discussion in the debate on
the amendments in the House of Commons on November
20, 1925. Mr R H Morris challenged the meaning of this
phrase (HC Deb, vol 188, col 834, November 20,1925),
and the Home Secretary agreed that it was not possible to
“prevent every photographer taking photographs of
witnesses going to or leaving the court, but when they are
crossing the pavement leading to the court there ought to
be the sanctity of the court to protect them” (HC Deb, vol
188, col 840, November 20,1925).
The difficulty in enforcing such a clause was addressed
by a number of MPs, and Lieutenant Commander
Kenworthy commented on the problems of enforcement:
“I think this goes much too far. I do not know where the
precincts are supposed to begin and end. The precincts of
a cathedral, for example, are a very wide area. It is much
too vague …” (HC Deb, vol 188, cols 841–42; c847,
November 20, 1925, comment of Mr Andrew MacClaren).
When pressed on this point in more detail, the Home
Secretary suggested that “precincts” included, in regard to
the Law Courts, the corridors and the steps leading to the
courtyard, but went on to conclude that: “It would be a
matter for the Court to decide’ (HC Deb, vol 188, col 848,
November 20, 1925). References were made to the
number of photographers that were already present
outside courts at the time the amendments were being
debated, and whether the clause should include the public
highway. It seems that the plethora of photographers
outside the Royal Courts of Justice (and other courts across
the world) were a part of the fabric of life in 1925 as they
remain today. (For further discussion about the meaning of
“precincts of a court” and the futility of enforcing the
provisions of the clause, see Gerry Rubin, “Seddon, Dell
and Rock n’ Roll: Investigating Alleged Breaches of the Ban
on Publishing Photographs Taken Within Courts or Their
Precincts, 1925–1967”, 880–87); it is debatable whether,
when the CCTV cameras were installed, that the court
officials were breaking the law; (Martin Dockray, “Cameras
at the door of the court”, (1990) 140 NLJ 548).
THE FUTURE
It is plain that the Minister of Justice in the UK intends
to permit the broadcasting of legal proceedings in the
future, as set out in Proposals to allow the broadcasting, filming,
and recording of selected court proceedings (May 2012, Ministry
of Justice). To this effect, a provision has been included in
the Crime and Courts Bill (HL Bill 4) section 22 (the first
reading took place on May 10, 2012 in the House of Lords,
the second reading took place on May 28, 2012, and the
committee stage began on June 18, 2012). The legislation
seeks to enable the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence
of the Lord Chief Justice, to provide that the prohibitions
set out in the Criminal Justice Act 1925 and Contempt of
Court Act 1981 may be lifted. It is initially planned to
broadcast judgments and sentencing decisions in cases
before the Court of Appeal (Criminal and Civil Divisions).
It is possible that the broadcasting of the sentencing
remarks in the Crown Court may also be considered at a
later date. These plans, by implication, appear to deal with
some of the concerns over human rights. It is necessary for
justice to be open and exercised in such a way as to be as
fair as possible, but the introduction of cameras into courts
should not lead to unfairness for the parties because of the
way the media broadcasts events in courts.
Stephen Mason
Barrister; Associate Research fellow, IALS
23015 Amicus 91 Autumn text.qxd:Text  5/12/12  12:05  Page 27
